Opening Remarks by Kamins, Barry
City University of New York Law Review 




Bar of the City of New York 
Follow this and additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Barry Kamins, Opening Remarks, 10 N.Y. City L. Rev. 313 (2007). 
Available at: 10.31641/clr100202 
The CUNY Law Review is published by the Office of Library Services at the City University of New York. For more 
information please contact cunylr@law.cuny.edu. 
OPENING REMARKS
Barry Kamins*
Good morning, and welcome to what will be a stimulating pro-
gram about a disturbing subject.  You will hear an extensive analy-
sis and discussion of the many issues evoked by the Guantánamo
detention facility.  I have the responsibility to set the table for this
discussion, and I want to do that by giving a brief history of the
Guantánamo detention experience.  I then want to address the re-
cent efforts by the Bush administration to demonize the lawyers
who have so valiantly worked to preserve our Constitution and sys-
tem of justice in the face of an unprecedented onslaught by the
executive branch.  Finally, I’ll mention some of what the New York
City Bar Association has done to respond.
The detention facility at Guantánamo was built in just ninety
hours in January of 2002 on the long-term naval base the United
States maintains on the tip of Cuba.1  Why place this facility at
Guantánamo?  It combined proximity to the United States with
what the administration believed was sufficient distance from U.S.
territory to be beyond the reach of our nation’s courts.2  Thus, it
was designed to be both geographically and legally beyond the
reach of the law.
As many as 800 detainees have served time at the facility.3
They arrived under many different circumstances.  Some were
picked up on the field of battle in Afghanistan.4  Many were given,
or often sold for a bounty, to U.S. troops by the Northern Alliance5
* President, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 2006–2008.
1 Joan Ullman, Book Review, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 7, 2007, at 2 (reviewing JOSEPH MAR-
GULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2006)).
2 Human Rights Watch, United States: Guantánamo Two Years On: U.S. Detentions
Undermine the Rule of Law (Jan. 9, 2004), http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/
09/usdom6917.htm (“The Bush Administration has attempted to turn the forty-eight
square miles of its naval base at Guantánamo Bay into territory beyond the reach of
any law and outside the jurisdiction of any court.”).
3 Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Terrorism Tribunals Set to Begin Work, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2004,
at A22.
4 See Profile: Guantánamo Bay, BBC NEWS, Oct. 17, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/americas/4720962.stm.
5 The Northern Alliance is an Afghan opposition organization whose goal is to
defeat the Taliban. Who Are the Northern Alliance?, BBC NEWS, Nov. 13, 2001, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1652187.stm.
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or other factions allied with the United States in the Afghan war.6
Others were picked up by U.S. agents, under circumstances that
are far from clear, in Europe and in Africa.7  Collectively, the de-
tainees were labeled “the worst of the worst” by administration offi-
cials.8  They were considered from the outset to have no
established human rights of any kind.  The President made an
early finding that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the de-
tainees.9  It is not clear that, prior to this, any government in the
post-Geneva Conventions world has declared an entire group of
foreign detainees to be beyond the reach of any international
human rights protections.
The conditions under which the detainees have been held are
clearly consistent with the assumption that they are all guilty of
crimes against the United States; most have been kept in periods of
isolation, frequently shackled,10 limited in their social contact and
exposure to fresh air, with nothing to read but the Koran and virtu-
ally nothing to do.11  Furthermore, many—perhaps all—of the de-
tainees were seen as sources of intelligence.  Orders were given,
and techniques approved by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, to ex-
tract intelligence using means that at least constituted cruel, inhu-
man, and degrading treatment and quite possibly constituted
torture.12  We know this from the freed detainees who have told
their stories,13 but we also know this from reports of what our own
FBI agents observed.14  Some of the techniques were scaled back,
but water boarding, shackling in severely uncomfortable positions,
sensory overload, nudity, chilling temperatures, and many other
6 Christopher E. Smith & Cheryl D. Lema, Justice Clarence Thomas and Incommuni-
cado Detention: Justifications and Risks, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 783, 796 (2005).
7 Profile: Guantánamo Bay, supra note 5.
8 Jonathan Hafetz, Habeas Corpus, Judicial Review, and Limits on Secrecy in Detentions
at Guantánamo, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 127, 129 (2006).
9 Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President, et al., Re:
Humane Treatment of al Qaeda & Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), available at
http://www.library.law.pace.edu/research/020207_bushmemo.pdf [hereinafter
Memorandum from President George W. Bush].
10 Patrick E. Tyler, Ex-Guantánamo Detainee Charges Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2004, at A10.
11 Amnesty International, Cruel and Inhuman: Conditions of Isolation for Detainees at
Guantánamo Bay (Apr. 5, 2007), http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR51
0512007.
12 See Human Rights Watch, Interrogation Techniques for Guantánamo Detainees (Aug.
19, 2004), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/08/19/usdom9248.htm [hereinafter
Interrogation Techniques].
13 Id.
14 FBI, DETAINEES POSITIVE RESPONSES: GUANTÁNAMO BAY INQUIRY (2004), available
at http://foia.fbi.gov/guantanamo/detainees.pdf.
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forms of abuse continued to be available to, and employed by,
Guantánamo interrogators.15  These are practices that the United
States has traditionally protested as human rights violations in
other countries.16
So, are these detainees “the worst of a very bad lot”?  Are they
guilty and deserving of treatment devoid of human rights
protections?
We know that U.S. officials at Guantánamo over the years have
said that many of the detainees pose no risk to the United States.17
As of March 6, 2007, the United States has released more than half
of the persons who served time in Guantánamo due to a lack of any
evidence of wrongdoing.18  While many were released under the
pretext that the country to whom they are being released will de-
tain them, at the very least, a substantial number of the detainees
now live freely in those countries.19  Some of the remaining detain-
ees are Uighurs (pronounced wee-gurs)—Chinese Muslims who
pose absolutely no risk to the United States, but who would be at
risk of punishment for their beliefs if sent back to China.20  So
rather than let this handful of detainees live freely in the United
States, they continue to be detained in the isolation of Camp 6 at
Guantánamo.21
We also know that an analysis by Professor Mark Denbeaux
and colleagues at Seton Hall University School of Law found that
more than half of the detainees who had gone through the Com-
batant Status Review Tribunals (to which I will return) set up by
the Defense Department have not been accused of engaging in
hostile acts against the United States.22
15 E.g., Colum Lynch, Military Prison’s Closure Is Urged, WASH. POST, May 20, 2006, at
A1 (noting that a United Nations anti-torture panel criticized military use of water
boarding as an interrogation technique in Guantánamo.).
16 See Eric Green, New Reports Condemn Human Rights Violations in Cuba, Venezuela
(Apr. 5, 2007), http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfileenglish&y=
2007&m=April&x=200704051355461xeneerg4.133242e-02.
17 See, e.g., Carol J. Williams, U.S. to Free 141 Terror Suspects, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25,
2006, at A1 (citing confidential U.S. officials as sources).
18 Morning Edition: Freed from Gitmo, Where Do Detainees Go? (NPR radio broadcast
July 30, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
12344597.
19 See id. (reporting that upon release, detainees have “essentially returned to their
lives.”).
20 Josh White, Lawyers Demand Release of Chinese Muslims, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2006,
at A13.
21 Detainees were moved into Camp 6, the modern detention facility at Guantá-
namo Bay, in December 2006.  Tim Golden, Military Taking a Tougher Line with Detain-
ees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2006, at A1.
22 MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUX, REPORT ON GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEES: A
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Surely, you would assume that the United States, the beacon
of justice and the rule of law in the modern world, would have
undertaken some procedures to determine if the detainees were
rightfully detained.  Unfortunately, this is not the case.  Appar-
ently, despite the above evidence to the contrary, the detainees
were assumed to be guilty and, aside from being subjected to abu-
sive interrogations,23 were simply being left to rot in Guantánamo
for the length of the “war on terror,” which we all know will be
unending.
Contrary to Article 5 of the Geneva Conventions, which re-
quires a status hearing where there is any doubt as to the status of
someone captured during a conflict,24 the United States made no
effort to evaluate the basis for the detentions until prodded by the
Supreme Court in June 2004, in its Hamdi decision.25  Then, the
Defense Department established Combatant Status Review Tribu-
nals,26 about which I am sure you will hear more.  In these tribu-
nals, detainees are not brought before a neutral decision maker
but before military officials who are notified that the detainee’s sta-
tus as an enemy combatant has already been established.27  The
detainees are not permitted the advice of attorneys.28
Rather, a detainee is assisted by a personal representative who
does not serve as an advocate; communications between the de-
tainee and the personal representative are not confidential and
may be revealed by the personal representative to the Tribunal.29
Detainees are not permitted to see any of the classified evidence
upon which their enemy combatant status determination was
based.30  The Tribunal is not bound by any rules of evidence and is
free to rely on hearsay.31  All of the government’s evidence is then
PROFILE OF 517 DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DATA (Feb.
2006), available at http://law.shu.edu/aaafinal.pdf.
23 Interrogation Techniques, supra note 13 (listing techniques such as stress positions,
isolation, sensory deprivation, and hooding).
24 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 5, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
25 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
26 Amnesty International, Military Commissions, Like CSRT’s, Threaten to Whitewash
Detainee Abuse (Mar. 23, 2007), http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=&
id=ENGAMR510462007.





30 Neil A. Lewis, Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, But Hardly in Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2004, at A1.
31 Guantánamo Bay Tribunals, supra note 28.
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entitled to a rebuttal presumption and is evaluated using the pre-
ponderance-of-the-evidence standard.32  These procedures turn
tribunals into sham proceedings that do not remotely satisfy the
ideals of fundamental fairness for which the United States has long
been known.  Not surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of in-
mates lose their hearings; some have refused to participate.33
From July 2004 to January 2006, only thirty-eight of 558 detainees
prevailed at their hearings.34
Some detainees have been designated as appropriate for trial
under the military commissions procedure the administration first
announced in November 2001, to widespread criticism.
Although the procedures had been approved several times in
the intervening years, the Supreme Court still found them wanting
in its Hamdan ruling in 2006.35  Since then, some further improve-
ments were made in the Military Commissions Act and the recently
released rules, but deficiencies still remain—deficiencies that will
call into question any verdicts resulting from commission trials.
The American legal community became engaged in the Guan-
tánamo facility early in its life.  In addition to the Center for Consti-
tutional Rights, which took a leading role in providing and
coordinating representation, lawyers from firms of all sizes volun-
teered to represent detainees.36  Their efforts have led to two
favorable Supreme Court decisions,37 major changes in administra-
tion policy with regard to military commissions, and quite possibly
to an easing in the interrogation techniques to which the detainees
were subjected.  And, as a result, the Bush administration has un-
dertaken a campaign to demonize these lawyers.38  It has tried to
embarrass the lawyers and encourage their clients to press them to
drop the detainee representation.39  A recent Wall Street Journal
column suggested the lawyers were allied with al Qaeda in pursu-
ing a tactic of “lawfare,” invoking domestic and international law
32 Id.
33 Lewis, supra note 31.
34 Kathleen T. Rhem, 38 Guantánamo Detainees to be Freed After Tribunals, AM.
FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 30, 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.
aspx?id=31063.
35 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2798 (2006).
36 See Editorial, Unveiled Threats: A Bush Appointee’s Crude Gambit on Detainees’ Legal
Rights, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2007, at A18 [hereinafter Unveiled Threats].
37 Hamdan; Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
38 See The Federal Drive with Mike Causey and Jane Norris: Is It Just Us? (Federal News
Radio broadcast Jan. 11, 2007), available at http://www.federalnewsradio.com/
emedia/59677.wma (Cully Stimson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for De-
tainee Affairs, reading a list of law firms representing Guantánamo detainees).
39 Unveiled Threats, supra note 36.
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and legal tactics to serve the purposes of the terrorists.40
I find this not only deeply troubling but ironic.  We have an
administration which has proclaimed people guilty without charge
or trial, claiming the right to detain them for life without any
human rights protections, and which has lost twice at the Supreme
Court when it argued that detainees do not have access to the
United States justice system.  And yet the administration argues
that the lawyers are aiding the enemy by having the nerve to say
there may be violations of law and human rights?
I would turn this argument further.  We should be embar-
rassed by our government’s callous disregard of the rule of law and
human rights.  One could even argue that the administration itself
has been abusing legal processes for lawless purposes.  Here are
some examples:
• The Bush administration determined that the Geneva Con-
ventions did not apply to anyone detained in Guantá-
namo,41 a finding overturned by the Supreme Court.42
• The administration, in its now infamous series of memo-
randa, only some of which have been disavowed, provided
incredulous interpretations of U.S. law so that what we
commonly conceive to be torture would be justified.43
• The administration established military commissions that
the Supreme Court found to lack fundamental due process
even after numerous revisions to the rules, and which have
been so faulty that after five years, no proceeding has got-
ten beyond the most preliminary stages.
• For over two years, the administration failed to establish
any procedure to review whether the government was right
to hold a detainee.  When pressed by the Supreme Court,
the government established the woefully inadequate Com-
batant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) system.44  The last
40 Debra Burlingame, Gitmo’s Guerrilla Lawyers: How an Unscrupulous Legal and PR
Campaign Changed the Way the World Looks at Guantánamo, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2007, at
A17, available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=
110009758.
41 Memorandum from President George W. Bush, supra note 10.
42 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485.
43 For a summary of the key points of the memos and links to PDF versions, see
Dahlia Lithwick, The Legal Memos: How the Rules Were Rewritten, SLATE, May 26, 2005,
http://www.slate.com/features/whatistorture/LegalMemos.html. For links to all
Memos and Reports on Treatment of Detainees, see Pace Law School Library, http://
www.library.law.pace.edu/government/detainee_memos.html (last visited Sept. 9,
2007).
44 For an overview of the procedures used in Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRT), see Memorandum from Gordon England, Deputy Sec’y of Def., for Sec’ys of
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Congress was complicit in this failure by providing, in the
Detainee Treatment Act, that detainees can challenge the
CSRT only with regard to procedural deficiencies.45  This is
not a meaningful review, particularly when the detainees
are at risk of losing their liberty for the rest of their lives.
• The Justice Department has made a series of troubling le-
gal arguments that attempt to avoid any accountability for
misconduct.  Here are a couple of examples:
° In several pending court cases covering a number of is-
sues, the administration claims that the state secrets
doctrine prevents a court from even considering a case.
This has been invoked in all three cases involving the
warrantless surveillance program.46
° In the Padilla case and in other proceedings, the admin-
istration argues that the interrogation techniques which
may have caused serious abuse and may have rendered
Padilla unfit to assist in his defense47 cannot be dis-
closed for reasons of national security.48
° A key part of the Military Commissions Act passed last
fall would immunize government officials for mistreat-
ment of detainees prior to the passage of the Act.49
• The administration has sought to avoid court cases chal-
lenging their allegedly unlawful activities by manipulating
the judicial process.  For example, the transfer of Padilla
from “enemy combatant status” to criminal defendant
brought the administration a stinging rebuke from a hith-
erto friendly Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.50
the Military Dep’ts (July 14, 2006), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Aug2006/d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf.
45 Detainee Treatment Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–148, § 1005, 119 Stat. 2739,
2740 (2005).
46 ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 2007); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F.
Supp. 2d 974, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 06-CV-
00313 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 17, 2006).
47 Deborah Sontag, A Videotape Offers a Window into a Terror Suspect’s Isolation, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2006, at A1.
48 See Government’s Motion in Limine Regarding Classified Information at Trial at
1, United States v. Padilla, No. 04-60001 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2006).
49 Letter from Barry M. Kamins, President, Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., to
Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 6, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/Restoration_Habeas_Corpus.pdf [herein-
after Letter from Barry M. Kamins].
50 Padilla, 432 F.3d at 585 (“It should go without saying that we cannot rest our
decisions on media reports of statements from anonymous government sources re-
garding facts relevant to matters pending before the court, nor should we be required
to do so or to speculate as to facts based upon such reports. The information that the
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• The confiscation of attorney-client privileged material
from the detainees after the three suicides last year, on the
pretext that one of the notes was written on a piece of pa-
per provided by a lawyer to a client—when virtually the
only paper available to the detainees was the lawyer–client
privileged documents.51
This is a sampling, and I am sure you have your own list, per-
haps longer.  We face an administration with disdain for law and
the role of lawyers, yet it seeks to use legal machinations for the
least dubious purposes.  We cannot take a step back from our ef-
forts to be sure that what our government does comports with its
Constitution and laws.  We cannot forfeit the playing field to an
administration seeking an unprecedented expansion of executive
power and a reduction of the countervailing judicial power to
insignificance.
The New York City Bar Association has been involved in chal-
lenging the administration’s policies throughout this post 9/11 pe-
riod.52  To mention just a few of our actions:
• We provided an early, extensive analysis of the President’s
executive order establishing the military commissions, and
facilitated the American Bar Association’s (ABA) passage
of a resolution critical of the commissions.  We have
worked closely with the ABA since in pressing our joint
concerns about human rights and due process;
• We have pressed the Defense Department with regard to its
failure to provide status reviews for the detainees and have
critiqued the changes in commission rules;
• We provided an outlet for JAG officers53 to complain about
the treatment of detainees, which led to our extensive anal-
ysis of U.S. and international law relating to interrogation
of detainees, and also was part of what led to this issue be-
coming exposed in Congress and the media;
government would provide to the media with respect to facts relevant to a pending
litigation, it should be prepared to provide to the court.”).
51 Josh White, Signs of Detainees’ Planning Alleged: Messages Found on Legal Papers,
WASH. POST, July 8, 2006, at A1.
52 See, e.g., Press Release, The Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., City Bar Petitions
U.S. Supreme Court to Grant Padilla Right to Due Process (Apr. 12, 2004), available at
http://www.nycbar.org/PressRoom/PressRelease/2004_4_12.htm; Letter from Barry
M. Kamins, supra note 51.
53 JAG stands for Judge Advocate General’s Corps, and is the judicial arm of the
United States Armed Forces.  Office of Judge Advocate General, Dep’t of the Navy,
Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN) (2004), available at http://
www.jag.navy.mil/documents/JAGMAN2004.pdf.
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• We have participated in a number of amicus briefs on
many aspects of the administration’s post-9/11 policies;
• We lobbied Congress in support of efforts to rein in Execu-
tive power and against ill-conceived measures such as the
Military Commissions Act;
• We have written extensively about the practice of “ex-
traordinary rendition,” the handing of a detainee over to a
country likely to torture the detainee.
Much of our work has been compiled into a two-volume set
that will be published shortly.54
To conclude, I trust we will hear more today about what are
truly difficult and complicated legal issues, and there will be much
discussion of alternative ways to approach legal issues raised by the
Guantánamo experience in the future.  But underlying all of this is
a simple commitment to the rule of law.  Our detention policy at
Guantánamo has affronted our allies, enraged our enemies, and
diminished our moral standing around the globe.  We cannot have
the United States fighting for the defense of democratic principles
while itself undermining these principles.
Terrorism must be fought, but fundamental principles of law
and human rights must prevail.
Thank you for your time.
54 See THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF 9/11: LAWYERS REACT
TO THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM (James R. Silkenat & Mark R. Shulman eds.,
Praeger Security International 2007).

